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RESPONSE 
 
A TALE OF TWO STUDIES:  
THE REAL STORY OF TERRORISM FINANCE 
RICHARD GORDON† 
In response to Shima Baradaran, Michael Findley, Daniel Nielson & 
Jason Sharman, Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2014). 
INTRODUCTION 
I was pleased when I saw that the University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
had published a new article on terrorism financing,1 especially when I saw 
that my friend and frequent collaborator Jason Sharman was an author. But 
my pleasure turned to puzzlement, then to dismay, as I delved into it.  
The Article, entitled Funding Terror, consists of three parts. The first is 
primarily a discussion of what we already know about terrorism financing, 
focusing on the use of shell companies (not easy to define, but, more or less, 
companies that have no independent operations, significant assets, ongoing 
business activities, or employees2) by terrorists,3 and on steps recently taken 
 
†
 Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Global Security Law and Policy, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. I thank Bianca Nunes and Jessica Rice for thoughtful 
comments and suggestions. 
1 See Shima Baradaran, Michael Findley, Daniel Nielson & Jason Sharman, Funding Terror, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2014) [hereinafter Funding Terror]. 
2 EMILE VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS ET AL., STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY INITIA-
TIVE, THE PUPPET MASTERS: HOW THE CORRUPT USE LEGAL STRUCTURES TO HIDE 
STOLEN ASSETS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 37 (2011), available at http://star.worldbank.org/ 
star/sites/star/files/puppetmastersv1.pdf [hereinafter PUPPET MASTERS]; Funding Terror, supra note 
1, at 492.  
3 See Funding Terror, supra note 1, at 492-95. 
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by countries to reduce the threat of terrorism.4 This first part repeatedly 
asserts that terrorists use shell companies to facilitate their nefarious 
activities5 and discusses how the United States and other jurisdictions have 
responded by trying to prevent terrorists from doing so.6  
The second part of the Article presents an experimental study regarding 
the circumstances under which lawyers and certain other persons known as 
corporation service providers will assist different types of clients in setting 
up companies in different jurisdictions. The study finds that forming an 
anonymous shell company is not difficult, despite increased regulations 
following September 11—results that are “disconcerting and demonstrate 
that we are far from a world that is safe from terror.”7 While the quality of 
the study is excellent,8 its relevance to terrorism finance hinges on the 
accuracy of the conclusions in the first part of the Article—that terrorists 
use shell companies.9 Based on the results discussed in the second part, the 
third part draws conclusions about whether the jurisdictions identified in 
the second part are more likely to facilitate terrorism and whether domestic or 
international law governing the setting up of shell companies is more success-
ful as a deterrent to the formation of those companies by terrorists.10 Again, 
the relevance of this third part is tied to the conclusions of the first part.  
If it were true that terrorists regularly used shell companies, it might 
make sense to dedicate additional resources to stopping them, including 
 
4 See id. at 495-504. 
5 See, e.g., id. at 492 (“Finally, terrorists use shell companies to conceal and transfer money 
through bank accounts around the globe, including transfers within the United States.”); id. at 493 
(“Terrorists, in particular, view shell companies as an attractive medium to move money 
anonymously around the world.”); id. at 494 (“Indeed, many terrorist groups have used shell 
companies to launder and obscure their ties to illegal funds.”). 
6 See id. at 499 (noting that the United States has occasionally prosecuted individuals under 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–2339B, the “material support” statutes, in order to restrict the use of shell 
companies for terrorist financing); id. at 500 (listing as an example of domestic efforts to regulate 
money laundering the PATRIOT Act’s requirement “that broker–dealers file Suspicious Activity 
Reports (SARs) and that they take extra precautions when dealing with shell companies”); id. at 
502-�� (discussing the “significant international push to stop terrorism financing through money 
laundering, charities, trusts, and anonymous shell companies”). 
7  Id. at 478. 
8 In the past, my students and I worked with Professor Sharman on a preliminary version 
having to do with corrupt government officials rather than terrorists, see J.C. SHARMAN, THE 
MONEY LAUNDRY: REGULATING CRIMINAL FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2011), 
which means I am no doubt riddled with confirmation bias. 
9 See, e.g., Funding Terror, supra note 1, at ��� (“Indeed, our results suggest that these finan-
cial regulations [concerning the formation of shell companies] may not be effective constraints on 
funding terrorism.”). 
10 See id. at 527-30. 
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requiring corporation service providers to do a better job of detecting when 
their clients are really bad guys. Because, as the Article correctly notes, shell 
companies can be used for legitimate as well as illegitimate purposes, 
government must take care to fight the bad guys without overly impeding 
the good; 11  as a result, the rules must be more nuanced and therefore 
difficult to enforce than would be the case if shell companies were simply 
banned altogether. However, given that the resources to prevent bad guys 
from doing bad things are necessarily finite, shifting resources to initiatives 
intended to stop terrorists from setting up or using shell companies necessarily 
means shifting them from somewhere else. But if that somewhere else is actually 
stopping bad guys, and if the assertion that terrorists use shell companies is false, 
the result could actually harm antiterrorism efforts.  
I don’t know if existing antiterrorist financing efforts are effective or 
efficient, nor do I know if efforts to try to stop terrorists from using shell 
corporations would actually pay off—though I have my doubts.12 But more 
importantly, I’m fairly sure that no one knows—except maybe the terrorists 
themselves. Pretending we do could result in policy changes built largely on 
myth, which is usually not a good idea. Unfortunately, it is a myth to claim 
that we know terrorists are using shell companies to finance terrorism. That 
this myth masquerading as truth made it into one of the nation’s most respected 
law reviews is, in my view, unfortunate. 
I. A QUESTIONABLE PREMISE 
Let me provide a bit of background. On September 11, 2001, I was a sen-
ior staff member at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), specializing 
mostly in sovereign debt restructuring, but also overseeing the IMF’s rather 
limited involvement in anti–money laundering policies. After the attacks, 
the United States government (along with some key NATO allies) decided 
that an essential part of the fight against terrorism would be directed toward 
its financing.13 After securing a United Nations Security Council resolution 
supporting that endeavor,14 these countries tasked the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF)—an intergovernmental organization consisting mostly of 
OECD countries and set up to create and assess compliance with standards to 
 
11 See id. at 495. 
12 As in, serious doubts. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text. 
13 Richard K. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global Governance and Off-
shore Financial Centers, 88 N.C. L. REV. 501, 577 (2010). 
14 See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (recognizing “the need for 
States to complement international cooperation by taking additional measures to prevent and 
suppress . . . the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism”). 
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prevent money laundering15—to extend its remit to the financing of terror.16 
Within a month, it had done so, adopting eight “special” recommendations 
(read: standards) against the financing of terrorism.17 For various reasons, 
including global membership, lots of staff, and plenty of financial resources, 
the FATF asked the IMF (and the World Bank, although at that time as a 
more junior partner) to help lead the charge in encouraging countries to 
adopt these new terrorism financing standards, as well as the preexisting 
anti–money laundering guidelines. 18  The IMF’s Managing Director put 
together a select task force on combating the financing of terror, and I was 
named to it.19 I was the only lawyer on the task force and wound up writing 
much of the report, even though I knew very little about the topic. I’ve 
learned a bit since then.  
The FATF standards on money laundering and terrorism financing 
(which, since 2012, have been integrated into a unified whole, and which 
now include antiproliferation rules) essentially fall into three categories: (1) 
those concerning criminal law and law enforcement;20 (2) those concerning 
international cooperation;21 and (3) those designed to stop criminals from 
using financial institutions and certain designated nonfinancial businesses.22 
The FATF refers to this third category as “preventive measures.”23  
These preventive measures require financial institutions to identify their 
clients, create client profiles, weed out those who from the start look like 
they may be bad guys or controlled by bad guys, and then monitor the 
account activity of accepted clients to see if that activity varies from what is 
expected or reflects the kind of activity that known bad guys have undertaken 
in the past.24 Financial institutions are then supposed to look further into 
the questionable client activity and report to the government when they 
 
15 See About Us, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus (last visited May ��, ����). 
16 Gordon, supra note 13, at 577. 
17 Richard K. Gordon, Trysts or Terrorists? Financial Institutions and the Search for Bad Guys, 43 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 715 (2008). 
18 See Gordon, supra note 13, at 577-78. 
19 Id. at 577 & n.426. 
20 FATF, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND 
THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS 11-
13, 24-25 (2012), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/ 
pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (Recommendations 1-8, 29-32). 
21 Id. at 27-30 (Recommendations 36-40). 
22 Id. at 14-24 (Recommendations 9-28). 
23 Id. at 14. 
24 Richard Gordon, Terrorism Financing Indicators for Financial Institutions in the United States, 
44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 765, 772 (2012).  
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suspect the client may be a criminal, including a terrorist.25 Key to the 
process of successful activity monitoring is an understanding of what known 
bad guys have done in the past. Studies of these past actions are known as 
typologies, which can include special “red flag” indicators for particular 
types of nefarious activity.26  
The FATF and member governments had been developing money laun-
dering typologies and red flag indicators for many years, so that while 
financial institutions were not originally in the business of finding criminal 
proceeds, they at least had years of learning how to do so.27 The problem 
with adding terrorism financing to the list of activities that financial institu-
tions were required to look for, and requiring them to report to the gov-
ernment when they suspected they saw it, was that the FATF didn’t 
actually know how bad guys financed terrorism.28  It was one thing for 
governments to use their considerable investigative resources to identify 
terrorists or terrorist organizations and then pass those names along to 
financial institutions so that those institutions could verify whether they 
had any such clients, but yet another to ask financial institutions to identify 
terrorists based on their clients’ transactions alone.29 In fact, at least until 
recently, the FATF’s and member governments’ attempts to develop 
terrorism financing typologies and red flags had been fitful, incomplete, and 
based largely on a small number of cases that were often not even relevant.30  
In response to this problem, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism 
Implementation Task Force (CTITF)31 approached Professor Nikos Passas 
of Northeastern University, the Honorable Sue Eckert of Brown University, 
and me in early 2008 to undertake a comprehensive study of terrorism 
financing. We were asked, quite simply, to examine how terrorists actually 
financed their activities, and to draw conclusions from those facts. We 
divided the task into two parts: examining terrorism cases from the United 
States and those from the rest of the world. I took charge of the U.S. cases, 
while Sue and Nikos took on everywhere else. 
 
25 Id. at 772-73. 
26 Id. at 780. 
27 See id. at 786-87. 
28 See id. at 786-89. 
29 Id. at 786-87. 
30 Id. at 787-88 (noting that cases cited by the FATF “dealt almost entirely with individuals 
or organizations identified as having terrorism connections rather than . . . terrorism financing 
indicators”); Gordon, supra note 17, at 732-735. 
31 See Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/ 
terrorism/ctitf/index.shtml (last visited May 10, 2014) (describing the creation and role of the 
CTITF). 
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The reason for this division of labor was that we had help from the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) in identifying all instances where terrorism-
related prosecutions had taken place—not just for terrorism financing, but 
for any situation where the Department thought the defendant was a 
terrorist. The DOJ also helped us collect information about the cases. 
Eventually, the Department provided us with 263 U.S. cases in which the 
United States had alleged that the defendant(s) may have been involved in 
supporting terrorism or some form of terrorist activity. This list did not 
include the 9/11 terrorists, who had been reviewed extensively by the U.S. 
9/11 Commission and turned up no apparent terrorism financing indicators.  
Of these 263 cases, my students and I found only one instance where a 
shell company might possibly have been involved, although it may have 
been an active charitable trust—we couldn’t confirm one way or the other.32 
That was it. We did find nine instances where active charities were in-
volved,33 and six instances where active, otherwise legitimate companies were 
involved.34 Sue and Nikos had far less luck in turning up information on non-
U.S. cases, but found no incidents involving shell companies there either.35 
II. A LACK OF SUPPORT 
So, one of us has made a mistake. To investigate who—the authors of 
Funding Terror or the authors of the Report to the United Nations Counter-
Terrorism Implementation Task Force on Terrorism Financing Indica-
tors36—I started checking Funding Terror’s footnotes, which include plenti-
ful references to the important role of shell companies in terrorism 
financing. The authors make the bold claim that “one of the most dangerous 
and accessible financial tools used by terrorists today is the anonymous shell 
 
32 Sue Eckert, Richard Gordon & Nikos Passas, Report to the United Nations Counter-
Terrorism Implementation Task Force on Terrorism Financing Indicators 29-30 (2013) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author). While our study targeted instances where financial 
institutions were involved, shell companies did not turn up in any other context either. 
33 Id. at 29-31, 34-36, 40-44, 46. 
34 Id. at 32-37, 39-40, 46-47. 
35 Id. at 53-55. 
36 Our draft report to the United Nations underwent extensive peer review by the U.N. 
Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the U.N. Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban 
Sanctions Committee, the FATF, the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, and the 
World Bank, among others. We also had two, day-long symposia on the draft report, one at the 
U.N. and another at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. No one raised any 
questions with respect to the quality of our case identifications or descriptions. 
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company,”37 but at best their sources prove only that terrorists could use 
shell companies.  
In footnote after footnote, the authors cite to sources that either make 
broad statements about shell companies generally, or merely speculate that 
these vehicles might be used by terrorists, to support their proposition that 
terrorists are using shell companies to fund their activities (and that the 
government needs to do more to prevent these dangerous activities). To 
start, the footnote supporting the statement that shell companies are “one of 
the most dangerous and accessible financial tools used by terrorists today”38 
cites to sources stating only that (1) a shell company “that is reluctant to 
provide information on controlling parties and underlying beneficiaries” 
may indicate money laundering (but not terrorism specifically)39 and (2) 
shell companies could be misused for money laundering or to finance 
terrorist activities and groups.40 As for the two sources supporting this 
second statement, the sources themselves are of no or nearly no probative 
value. Neither focuses on terrorism financing, nor do they offer any proof 
that terrorists actually use shell companies. I wouldn’t have minded if the 
authors of Funding Terror had written “according to sources that offer no 
evidence that what they write is correct, one of the most dangerous and 
accessible financial tools used by terrorists today is the anonymous shell 
company.” But they didn’t.  
Later in the Article, the authors of Funding Terror assert that “terrorists 
use shell companies to conceal and transfer money through bank accounts 
around the globe, including transfers within the United States,”41 but the 
book they cite, The Puppet Masters: How the Corrupt Use Legal Structures to 
Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It, shows only that shell companies 
 
37 Funding Terror, supra note 1, at 482. 
38 See id. at 482 & n.16. 
39  FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI–MONEY 
LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL app. F, at F-1 (2010), available at 
http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/documents/bsa_aml_man_����.pdf. There is no reference 
to terrorism at all on that page, which lists potentially suspicious activity that may indicate money 
laundering. The next section, “Potentially Suspicious Activity That May Indicate Terrorist 
Financing,” makes no reference to shell companies. Id. at F-9 to -11. 
40 See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC SHELL 
COMPANIES IN FINANCIAL CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING: LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES 13 (2006) (“In effect, the domestic shell company could be a vehicle to launder 
money, move money derived from crime, or finance terrorist activities and groups, all completely 
anonymously.”); They Sell Sea Shells, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2012, at 69, 69 (noting that shell 
companies have legitimate uses but “can also be misused—for tax evasion, money laundering, 
sanctions-busting or terrorism”).  
41 Funding Terror, supra note 1, at 492. 
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can be used to conceal ownership information.42 There is not a word about 
terrorism or terrorists. And, in support of their contention that “many 
terrorist groups have used shell companies to launder and obscure their ties 
to illegal funds,”43 the authors provide nothing more than a vague reference 
to an unidentified FBI prosecution. The supporting footnote quotes a Forbes 
article as stating that “individuals associated with al-Qaeda have used shell 
companies in Utah and California ‘to commit bank fraud and money 
laundering and possibly to fund terrorist activities in the Middle East.’”44 
But in reality, this quote is a reference to a statement by an unidentified 
FBI agent that a certain, unnamed prosecution that I can’t identify involves 
shell companies that may, and I quote, “possibly” involve terrorism. This is a 
far cry from the claim that “many terrorist groups have used shell companies.”45 
While shell companies’ potential for abuse might be particularly worri-
some if it were true that “[t]errorists, in particular, view shell companies as 
an attractive medium to move money anonymously around the world,”46 the 
authors provide no proof that terrorists do indeed view them in this light. 
In support of their statement, the authors cite to a Wall Street Journal article, 
Tax Report: IRS Cracks Down on Dodgers Who Use Onshore Tax Havens.47 The 
sole reference to terrorism in that article is a quote from Senator Norm 
Coleman (R–Minnesota), who said, “‘[t]he absence of ownership disclosure 
requirements and lax regulatory regimes in many of our states make U.S. 
shell companies attractive vehicles for those seeking to launder money, 
evade taxes, finance terrorism, or conduct other illicit activity anonymous-
ly.’”48 So, it’s not terrorists “in particular” that view shell companies as 
attractive; in fact, terrorism is only one of several enumerated types of 
 
42 PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 2, at 37. The Funding Terror authors also cite Puppet Masters 
earlier in their Article to make the leap from the book’s description of shell companies as “hollow” 
(again, without reference to terrorism or terrorists) to the claim that this feature makes shell 
companies “commonly used” for terrorism. See Funding Terror, supra note 1, at 483 & n.18 (citing 
PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 2, at 35). 
43 Funding Terror, supra note 1, at 494. 
44 Id. at n.84 (quoting Elizabeth MacDonald, Shell Games, FORBES, Feb. 12, 2007, at 96, 96). 
45 The second part of the footnote reads “see also Glenn R. Simpson, Palestinian Bank Faces 
U.S. Probe on Laundering, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2005, at B3 (describing a ‘major crackdown’ on the 
use of shell companies to fund terrorism).” Funding Terror, supra note 1, at 494 n.84. In reality, the 
Simpson article’s use of the phrase “major crackdown” actually references a crackdown on banks 
for failing to implement anti–money laundering laws. Simpson, supra. There is no reference to 
shell companies anywhere in the article, although there is mention of active charities. Id. In other 
words, the footnote is simply wrong. 
46 Funding Terror, supra note 1, at 493. 
47 Id. at 493 n.82 (citing Tom Herman, Tax Report: IRS Cracks Down on Dodgers Who Use 
Onshore Tax Havens, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2006, at D2). 
48 Herman, supra note 47. 
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illegal activity that shell companies could theoretically facilitate. Also, the 
Wall Street Journal article indicates no actual proof that the Senator knows 
what he’s talking about. The authors of Funding Terror leave us with a 
conclusion that terrorists, in particular, view shell companies as an attractive 
medium, while the source demonstrates only that Senator Coleman has a 
view—based on what, we do not know—that, terrorists, among others, view 
shell companies as such.  
Funding Terror’s assertion that the United States and other jurisdictions 
have responded to terrorists’ abuse of shell companies by trying to prevent 
that abuse is also unsupported by the sources they cite. The authors claim 
that the United States “has occasionally enforced the material support 
statutes” in order “to restrict the use of shell companies for terrorist financ-
ing,” 49  but the corresponding footnote cross-references footnotes whose 
sources do not even mention shell companies.50 Likewise, their statement 
that the PATRIOT Act requires broker–dealers to “take extra precautions 
when dealing with shell companies” finds no support in a reference to an 
article that includes no discussion of shell companies.51 
III. NEGLIGIBLE FUTURE RISK 
Speaking personally, I believe terrorists haven’t been using shell compa-
nies to finance terrorism because they haven’t had to; setting up shell 
companies is a step they just don’t need to take.52 I have a few hypotheses 
about this, which I will outline briefly.  
 
49 Funding Terror, supra note 1, at 499. 
50 See id. at n.116; id. at 497 nn.105-06 (citing Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Ter-
rorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2005), and Andrew 
Peterson, Addressing Tomorrow’s Terrorists, 2 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 297 (2008)). 
51 See id. at 500 & n.119 (citing Alan E. Sorcher, Lost in Implementation: Financial Institutions 
Face Challenges Complying With Anti–Money Laundering Laws, 18 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 395 (2005)). 
Although Lost in Implementation discusses “shell banks,” these are quite different from shell 
companies—though both confusingly use the same adjective. Shell banks are licensed financial 
institutions that have no physical presence in the country in which they are incorporated and 
licensed, making it difficult to collect information during the supervisory examination process. See 
Glossary of the FATF Recommendations: “Shell Bank,” FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/ 
glossary/s-t (last visited May ��, ����). Shell banks are also unaffiliated with a regulated financial 
group and are therefore not subject to effective consolidated supervision. See id. 
52 It is possible that terrorists have tried to create shell companies but have failed, perhaps 
because corporation service providers have refused to assist them. There is, however, no evidence 
to suggest this. Even the authors of Funding Terror acknowledge that “the terrorism condition 
findings show that relying on [corporation service providers] to decline customers that pose a 
terrorism risk may not adequately deter terrorism financiers. . . . In many cases, [corporation 
service providers] did not even require identifying information from customers posing an obvious 
risk of terrorism.” Funding Terror, supra note 1, at 523. 
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There are many proven instances where, to further their criminal activi-
ties, money launderers have utilized companies—both shell companies and 
operational companies used as fronts53—or other legal persons like charities. 
As I see it, these instances are all due to the fact that for some time, anti–
money laundering rules have required banks and other financial institutions, 
including money services businesses, to identify their customers, maintain 
customer records, and report suspicious transactions.54  
If you are a known crook, you obviously don’t want to identify yourself 
to a financial institution, and if you are an as-yet-unknown crook, divulging 
your name might allow some investigator to later find and question you. If 
you set up a company or other legal entity, however, the company will be 
the account holder, not you. And, if you can hide your ownership of or 
control over the account—and mind you, financial institutions are supposed 
to make this difficult55—it becomes easier to keep your name from the bank or 
other financial institution, or from criminal investigators.56  
But there is at least one other key reason to operate through a company 
rather than as an individual. Anti–money laundering rules require that 
financial institutions learn about their customers, including the nature of 
their businesses and, where necessary (as in, where there are doubts about a 
customer57), the sources of funds for customers’ accounts.58 If a customer 
does not present a convincing argument that its activities are legitimate, the 
bank might decline to open the account and might even file a report with 
the government.59 If, however, an individual forms a company, he can build 
and provide the financial institution with a backstory that paints the 
company as a real business generating legitimate funds. This is often much 
easier than creating a backstory for a physical person, especially when a lot 
 
53 See PUPPET MASTERS, supra note �, at �� (“Operational entities have inflows and out-
flows of assets, which enables streams of illicit assets to be mingled with legitimate funds and 
thereby laundered. Thus, substantial amounts of money can be transferred without raising 
suspicion.”). 
54 I have described the system in detail in previous work. See Gordon, supra note 24, at 772-81. 
55 See id. at ��� (noting that the FATF requires that financial institutions take “reasonable 
measures to identify the physical persons who own or control” the company or other legal person 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
56 See OECD, BEHIND THE CORPORATE VEIL: USING CORPORATE ENTITIES FOR 
ILLICIT PURPOSES 13 (2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/43703185.pdf. 
57 See FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 39, at 64-65 (explaining that 
a bank “may determine that a customer poses a higher risk because of the customer’s business 
activity, ownership structure, [or] anticipated or actual volume and types of transactions, including 
those transactions involving higher-risk jurisdictions”). 
58 Gordon, supra note 24, at 775. 
59 Id. at 775, 777. 
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of money is involved and the launderer isn’t known as a business or finan-
cial genius.60  
The advantage of using a front or otherwise legitimate company is that 
much of the backstory is built in, although it may require a little tweaking 
to explain why business has been so good lately. The disadvantage of using 
a front is that you either have to build one from scratch or take over another 
one, which in either case requires recruiting a fair number of confederates 
who are not otherwise necessary in the criminal undertaking. That can be 
difficult or even dangerous, in that one of these confederates may make a 
revealing mistake or simply decide to turn you in. The advantage of using a 
shell company is that you need no confederates (other than maybe a corpo-
ration service provider), but the tradeoff is that it will be much harder to 
develop a convincing backstory.  
So why might terrorists not turn to shell companies? The reasons seem 
to be twofold, though so far, I haven’t been able to interview any terrorists 
to confirm.61 As noted above, Sue Eckert, Nikos Passas, and I discovered 
fourteen cases where terrorists used otherwise legitimate front companies or 
active charities to facilitate their illegal acts.62 While we found that criminal 
proceeds were used to finance terror in only six cases,63 in all cases the 
financial institution should have inquired as to the purpose of the account 
and looked at any unusual transactions that took place; 64  this inquiry 
occurred in a minimum of twelve cases.65 If the only drawback to a front 
company is the risk of being ratted out, terrorists may opt to use them 
 
60 Other reasons that companies might be appealing vehicles through which to engage in 
criminal activities include the ease with which multiple legal persons can be set up in multiple 
jurisdictions, thereby making it more difficult for investigators to operate across many different 
countries, laws, and legal systems. OECD, supra note 56, at 15. 
61 I have tried. 
62 See supra notes 33-�� and accompanying text. One of the identified cases involved both a 
front company and an active charity. 
63 See Eckert, Gordon & Passas, supra note 32, at 30-31, 37-39, 44-45, 47, 51-52. 
64 One “red flag” indicating potential money laundering or terrorism financing is a funds 
transfer to “a higher-risk geographic location without an apparent business reason.” FED. FIN. 
INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 39, at F-2. High-risk geographic locations are 
determined by financial institutions based on five criteria. See Bank Secrecy Act (BSA): High-Risk 
Entities Identifying Worksheets, BANKERSONLINE, http://www.bankersonline.com/tools/ 
operational/mr_highriskentities.pdf (last visited May 10, 2014) (describing high-risk countries as 
(1) those “in which the production or transportation of illegal drugs may be taking place”; (2) 
“[b]ank secrecy havens”; (3) “[e]merging countries that may be seeking hard currency invest-
ments”; (�) “[c]ountries identified in FinCEN advisories”; and (�) “[m]ajor money laundering 
countries and jurisdictions”). Using that calculus, we found evidence of transactions to potentially 
higher-risk locations in twelve cases. See Eckert, Gordon & Passas, supra note 32, at 33-35, 38-40, 
43-46, 47-48, 52-53. 
65 See Eckert, Gordon & Passas, supra note 32, at 33-36, 38-40, 43-48, 52. 
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because it’s easier to find loyal, ideological recruits than it is to set up a shell 
company and construct a believable backstory.  
Sometimes terrorists might not even require the aid of a front company. 
In two cases covered in our report, the amount of money involved was so 
small that there was no need to open multiple accounts or start a company 
to build a backstory,66 while in two other cases where the amount was big, 
the terrorists used multiple individuals to open multiple accounts.67 While 
in each of these instances the account holders risked having their names 
turn up in a future investigation, as not-yet-known terrorists or confeder-
ates, they were unlikely to prompt a financial institution to ask too many 
questions or to file a suspicious transaction report. Maybe the individuals 
were innocent dupes, didn’t think they’d get investigated, didn’t care, or 
even looked forward to it. After all, they were probably either stooges or 
true believers.  
If I’m correct, making it more difficult to create shell companies neither 
would have stopped terrorists in the past nor will it stop them in the future.  
There is another problem. While the authors of Funding Terror have 
demonstrated quite convincingly that the rules on customer due diligence 
are not well enforced by corporation service providers, they do not present 
evidence suggesting that strategies to keep bad guys from using such 
providers can be effectively implemented. As the known cases of terrorism 
financing have demonstrated, there appear to be enough dupes or true-
believing confederates around to aid determined terrorists. I find it difficult 
to believe that plain vanilla money launderers won’t be able to persuade—
through fraud, threat, or compensation—people who appear honest to 
approach service providers to set up and “own” companies, whether shell or 
otherwise, on behalf of the bad guys. While investigators would find it 
useful for corporation service providers to record the identity of the physi-
cal person who sets up a company (thereby providing someone for investi-
gators to question as to who directed the formation of the company), I think 
efforts are better made at the level of the financial institution, via a shift 
from identifying who controls the corporate account to judging whether the 
corporate client and its transactions seem dodgy. Anything else could be an 
expensive waste of time.  
But all this is just a guess, albeit an educated one.  
 
66 See id. at 40-42. 
67 See id. at 41-42, 44-45. 
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CONCLUSION 
So, if there is no groundswell of evidence that terrorists actually use 
shell companies, why base a study of corporation service providers on such a 
premise? Clearly there is plenty of evidence that shell companies are used 
for money laundering.68 In fact, a recent book, Global Shell Games: Experi-
ments in Transnational Relations, Crime, and Terrorism 69 —coincidentally 
written by Jason Sharman, Michael Findley, and Daniel Nielson, three of 
the four authors of Funding Terror—uses an experimental technique similar 
to that found in the second part of that Article, but focuses less on terrorism 
than on corruption and money laundering. While shifting the focus to 
terrorism may have increased interest in the Funding Terror study, it 
unfortunately also decreased its relevance. 
Funding Terror asserts, and quite firmly, that the use by terrorists of shell 
companies is a known fact, and that policymakers should address this 
danger by expending resources directed at stopping it. The assertion, 
however, is not supportable, and the recommendation is therefore dubious. 
That it was presented in such a manner by one of the nation’s top law 
reviews is unfortunate and highlights the need for some aspect of peer 
review in the editing process—at least for specialized topics like terrorism 
financing. 
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68 See, e.g., PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 2. 
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